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Abstract 
This article applies the tenets of bureaucratic incorporation theory to an investigation of bureaucratic 
decision making in labor standards enforcement agencies (LSEAs), as they relate to undocumented 
workers. Drawing on 25 semistructured interviews with high-level officials in San Jose and Houston, I find 
that bureaucrats in both cities routinely evade the issue of immigration status during the claims-making 
process, and directly challenge employers’ attempts to use the undocumented status of their workers to 
deflect liability. Respondents offer three institutionalized narratives for this approach: (1) to deter 
employer demand for undocumented labor, (2) the conviction that the protection of undocumented 
workers is essential to the agency’s ability to regulate industry standards for all workers, and (3) to clearly 
demarcate the agency’s jurisdictional boundaries to preserve institutional autonomy and scarce 
resources. Within this context, enforcing the rights of undocumented workers becomes simply an 
institutional means to an end. 
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Abstract 
This article applies the tenets of bureaucratic incorporation theory to an investigation of 
bureaucratic decision making in labor standards enforcement agencies (LSEAs), as they relate to 
undocumented workers. Drawing on 25 semistructured interviews with high-level officials in 
San Jose and Houston, I find that bureaucrats in both cities routinely evade the issue of 
immigration status during the claims-making process, and directly challenge employers’ attempts 
to use the undocumented status of their workers to deflect liability. Respondents offer three 
institutionalized narratives for this approach: (1) to deter employer demand for undocumented 
labor, (2) the conviction that the protection of undocumented workers is essential to the agency’s 
ability to regulate industry standards for all workers, and (3) to clearly demarcate the agency’s 
jurisdictional boundaries to preserve institutional autonomy and scarce resources. Within this 









There are competing theories of how political processes shape the rights afforded to 
marginalized groups, such as the 11 million undocumented immigrants currently living in the 
United States. The deadlock of the current legislative context, which has left comprehensive 
immigration reform hinging on partisan politics, suggests that the power of constituents to sway 
their representatives is paramount. Another scene from the ongoing congressional drama of 
immigration reform has been the droves of activists performing sit-ins, marches, and other 
demonstrations to demand their rights as students, workers, and family members. Beyond the 
importance of political elites and the power of social movements, a third—perhaps more 
mundane—component in the process of advancing undocumented immigrant rights are the 
scores of bureaucrats who run the agencies that these individuals encounter on a daily basis. 
From the perspective of political control theory, newcomers must first have sufficient 
political power to elect sympathetic legislators who can in turn pressure bureaucracies to do their 
bidding (McCubbins et al. 1987; Meier and O’Toole 2006; Waterman, Rouse, and Wright 1998). 
On this count, undocumented immigrants are a disenfranchised population, as the federal 
government has launched a multipronged campaign to enhance immigration enforcement and 
limit undocumented immigrant rights. However, traditional political control theories do not 
account for the reality that, despite their noncitizen status and repeated congressional deadlock 
on immigration reform, undocumented immigrants across the country are being served by 
bureaucracies whose mission provides a logical argument for their incorporation. For example, 
undocumented immigrants in the United States enjoy access to a K-12 education (Olivas 2005), 
protections for undocumented victims of domestic violence (Salcido and Adelman 2004), and 
emergency hospital care for undocumented patients (Smith 2010). 
As such, recent research in the area of bureaucratic incorporation amends this earlier 
work in political control theory, highlighting instances where bureaucrats have deflected 
restrictive immigration policies by drawing on their organizational missions to evaluate an 
immigrant’s deservingness (Lewis and Ramakrishnan 2007). Bureaucrats in service agencies, 
Jones-Correa (2008) argues, are particularly disposed by their professional ethos to exercise 
individual discretion when they work with undocumented immigrants, and they are able to work 
around otherwise restrictive policies (see also Marrow 2009, 2011). 
Labor standards enforcement agencies (LSEAs) present an important, but thus far 
underexamined, case study for understanding the bureaucratic incorporation of immigrants. 
While the workplace has become a central site of immigration enforcement, LSEAs across the 
varied federal and state jurisdictions have made undocumented workers a top outreach priority. 
LSEAs comprise a complicated web of workplace enforcement that spans several issue areas 
(e.g., wage and hour, discrimination, health and safety, collective bargaining), across federal, 
state, and even local jurisdictions. As a result, workers enjoy a varied constellation of protections 
depending on where they are located. Furthermore, the allies undocumented workers can rely on, 
and the foes they have to face, can differ drastically from place to place. The predicted result 
would be uneven willingness to protect the rights of undocumented workers. 
To this end, in this paper, I seek to understand what motivates LSEA bureaucrats in two 
divergent political contexts to promote the rights of undocumented immigrants, and what 
institutional processes shape their interactions with these claimants. One might assume that a 
context with policies that are more friendly to undocumented workers would yield bureaucratic 
staff who are more willing to enforce the workplace protections of undocumented workers, while 
a more hostile context would foment more reticence among bureaucrats. However, if bureaucrats 
in two divergent political and advocacy environments are in fact operating with similar 
motivations, this suggests the continued importance of institutional factors for driving immigrant 
incorporation. 
In this paper, I find that LSEA bureaucrats in two distinct traditional immigrant 
destinations— San Jose and Houston—exhibit similar behaviors and cite parallel motivations for 
protecting the rights of undocumented workers. The primary mechanism for this bureaucratic 
incorporation, the extant literature has argued, is bureaucrats who deem clients morally worthy 
of service, regardless of their legal status. In contrast, rather than sympathy for downtrodden 
workers, bureaucrats I interview in both cities cite mundane institutional rationales as 
motivations for their behavior. In both places, they argue that to differentially enforce the rights 
of documented and undocumented workers would run counter to their fundamental mandate: to 
identify employers that violate labor and employment laws and levy the appropriate penalties. 
This orientation—doing the agency’s business day-to-day—leads LSEA bureaucrats to focus on 
a claimant’s eligibility as a covered employee and to avoid queries that would uncover the 
worker’s immigration status. To do so, these bureaucrats draw on their professional mission, not 
to judge the moral desert of undocumented claimants but instead, to advance their agency’s 
ability to preserve their organization’s raison d’ être. 
Within this context, LSEA bureaucrats discuss enforcing the rights of undocumented 
workers as simply a means to an end, not a value-driven discretionary act. This “don’t ask, don’t 
tell” approach is facilitated by the institutional distinction between determining whether a 
claimant’s rights have been violated and determining whether a remedy is warranted. In the 
pages that follow, I discuss three types of rationales LSEA bureaucrats offer for their status-blind 
approach: (1) aligning the goals of labor standards enforcement with a desire to deter the demand 
for undocumented labor, (2) articulating a need to protect all workers to maintain their ability to 
fulfill their statutory mandate, and (3) demarcating clear jurisdictional boundaries to preserve 
agency autonomy and scarce resources. 
I conclude that incorporation strategies that rely on a bureaucratic environment of passive 
ignorance may indeed facilitate incorporation for the select workers who file a claim. However, 
the status-blind approach of LSEA bureaucrats is not a panacea for the exploitation of 
undocumented workers who must rely on a workers’ rights bureaucracy that remains chronically 
underfunded, who have inferior opportunities for restitution, and who are subject to a global 
economy that perpetuates marginalization of immigrant workers. 
 
Theoretical Foundations 
Research on Bureaucratic Responses to Undocumented Communities 
Political sociologists have typically followed two threads of investigation as they have sought to 
understand how political processes affect the rights of undocumented immigrants. The first 
focuses on how certain political elites have pushed for expanded immigrant rights. These efforts 
have hinged on high-level political compromises and the ability of interest groups to sway 
decision makers (e.g., Tichenor 2002, 2009). The second line of inquiry examines the growth 
and mobilization of grassroots organizations whose mission is to pressure the federal government 
to halt deportations and push for a path for legalization. The immigrant rights’ marches of 2006 
in the United States brought thousands of undocumented immigrants out in protest, revealing 
alternative pathways to political incorporation for noncitizens (e.g., Pallares and Flores-González 
2009; Voss and Bloemraad 2011). 
Research on bureaucratic incorporation considers the question of immigrants’ rights from 
a third institutional perspective. This literature reveals that, apart from the processes of 
policymaking and the tactics of social movements, the ways in which bureaucrats implement 
laws also affect the lives of undocumented immigrants. One way to understand bureaucratic 
behavior is to examine how political elites use administrative procedures to extend their own 
interests by pressuring bureaucratic agents across “various venues of influence” (McCubbins et 
al. 1987; Waterman et al. 1998), sometimes even radically reshaping an agency’s priorities, 
resources, and leadership (Teles 2009). From this perspective, the treatment of minority groups 
such as undocumented immigrants, is ultimately dependent on their political influence (Lewis 
and Ramakrishnan 2007; Meier and O’Toole 2006) 
Yet, bureaucrats are not always the puppets of the political forces that fund their agencies 
and stack their boards and commissions. Bureaucrats can also be driven by interests that are quite 
distinct from those of the political actors who control them. Bureaucrats can, and do, engage in 
autonomous behavior. Although many early studies determined that bureaucratic discretion 
could prevent minorities from accessing key rights (Lipsky 1980), later work showed that 
bureaucrats could also be responsible for important innovations that sometimes serve not only 
agency goals but also the public good (Brehm and Gates 1999; O’Leary 2005). 
As such, recent studies point to the important role that bureaucratic incorporation plays as 
a non-electoral route to the integration of undocumented immigrants in a wide range of 
institutional arenas, such as libraries (Jones-Correa 2005), schools (Gonzales 2011), health care 
agencies (Marrow 2012), court systems (Marrow 2009), and even law enforcement agencies 
(Lewis and Ramakrishnan 2011). A primary factor shaping discretionary bureaucratic behavior is 
an agency’s mission, which is determined by statutes and subsequent court rulings that define the 
“rules of the game” (Marrow 2009). Bureaucrats in service agencies, who tend to work closely in 
empathic ways with their clients, are more likely to have a positive attitude toward immigrants 
than bureaucrats functioning in a regulatory capacity, who have minimal relationships with those 
who are being regulated (Jones-Correa 2005). 
Yet, we lack a deeper understanding of how the “institutional and ideational context 
created by policy paradigms in local communities” shapes bureaucratic behavior (Bernstein 
2011: 26). As such, LSEAs are an ideal institutional setting to examine the bureaucratic 
incorporation of immigrants, given the complex regulatory terrain of undocumented worker 
rights. Undocumented workers comprise 5.2 percent of the civilian labor force and have become 
structurally embedded in several low-wage industries rife with workplace violations (Cornelius 
et al. 2004; Passel and Cohn 2011). Their lack of legal status, however, makes undocumented 
workers particularly vulnerable targets for employer abuse, and less likely to come forward to 
file a claim. A contradictory set of federal and state statutes works at cross-purposes to create a 
confusing context for undocumented workers in this realm of “immployment law” (Griffith 
2011, 2012).  
 
The Legal and Bureaucratic Context for Undocumented Workers 
Although the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act is mostly known for initiating a 
sweeping amnesty, another of its important legacies is the establishment of employer sanctions, 
which instituted penalties for employers who hire undocumented workers. The landmark 2002 
Supreme Court ruling in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) rested its findings on International Register of Certificated Auditors (IRCA) when it 
denied an undocumented worker the key remedies of job reinstatement and back pay after he was 
fired for union organizing, a clear violation of the National Labor Relations Act. Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist, writing for the majority, argued that even though the facts in Hoffman 
affirmed the employer’s culpability, to grant undocumented immigrants full rights “not only 
trivializes the immigration laws, [but] also condones and encourages future violations.” In his 
dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer countered that the decision would grant egregious employers 
“immunity in borderline cases” and ultimately encourages employers to “hire with a wink and a 
nod those potentially unlawful aliens.” 
Since Hoffman, several other high-profile cases have reflected the unsettled nature of the 
law regarding undocumented workers’ rights. For example, in 2008, Agri Processors, Inc. v. 
NLRB reasserted an undocumented worker’s eligibility to participate in union elections. Yet, 
three years later, the NLRB concluded in Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc. that undocumented 
workers were ineligible for back pay remedies even in cases where the offending employer knew 
about their illegal status when they hired them (NLRB 2011). Critics have argued that this 
current environment of “rights without remedies” has created a culture of fear among 
undocumented workers, furthered their exploitation, and stifled collective bargaining efforts 
(Fisk and Wishnie 2005; Motomura 2010; Wishnie 2007). 
After Hoffman, state and federal LSEAs have worked hard to convey their ongoing 
willingness to uphold the rights of all workers regardless of immigration status, and to combat 
what advocates feared would be a chilling effect on worker rights. Although Hoffman prompted 
many agencies to review their policies for applying back pay and reinstatement remedies, the 
new ruling did not preclude LSEAs from processing claims and assessing employer culpability. 
The chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), for example, issued 
a public statement reaffirming that “protecting immigrant workers from illegal discrimination 
has been, and will continue to be, a priority for the EEOC.” He also directed all EEOC field 
offices to retain all other forms of relief in “accordance with existing standards, without regard to 
an individual’s immigration status” (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 2002a). 
The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) also proactively clarified its incorporative stance 
toward undocumented workers following Hoffman. In a public fact sheet, the DOL Wage and 
Hour Division declared that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Migrant and Seasonal 
Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSPA) were not affected by Hoffman and that the agency 
“will continue to enforce the FLSA and MSPA without regard to whether an employee is 
documented or undocumented” (U.S. Department of Labor 2007). In addition, the DOL vowed 
to continue managing its memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Immigration Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), meant to minimize ICE interference in DOL investigations (see Chen 2012; 
Lee 2011). In 2004, the DOL also entered a joint bilateral declaration with the Mexican 
government to facilitate outreach to Mexican workers. 
State LSEAs, even those in politically divergent contexts, have also clarified their labor 
policies in response to the Hoffman ruling. For example, the California Department of Industrial 
Relations (DIR), which enforces some of the most generous labor protections in the country, 
amended the state’s labor code to reiterate its commitment to protecting undocumented workers.  
Even in Texas, where support for undocumented workers has been politically fraught, the labor 
code does not explicitly exclude undocumented workers from either wage and hour, or 
discrimination protections. 
How, then, are LSEAs implementing this incorporative stance? What explains the 
tendency of LSEA bureaucrats to eschew any role in immigration enforcement and ignore the 
immigration status of the workers they encounter? Recalling the most expansive guest-worker 
program in U.S. history, Calavita (1992) provides a nuanced account of how the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) and DOL negotiated their respective agendas during the post-
war Bracero Program. Building on this previous work, Wells (2004) highlights how the 
conflicting norms and practices of INS and DOL also ultimately allowed DOL bureaucrats to 
deflect a mandate under IRCA to examine workers’ documentation status during the course of 
their labor standards investigations. Wells points to how “multiple levels, diverse administration 
branches, and decentralized agencies” have facilitated the “immigrant-inclusive” implementation 
of otherwise “immigrant-exclusive” federal policies (Wells 2004:1310). 
While Wells does not elaborate on the factors driving LSEA behavior, her findings reveal 
how “DOL’s mandates and operating procedures led its agents to assist minimally in employer 
sanctions enforcement from the start (Wells 2004:1333).” Although Wells’ argument affirms the 
bureaucratic incorporation thesis that a bureaucrat’s professional ethos can shape his or her 
behavior, it also shows how the structural arrangements between the INS and the DOL created 
openings for advancing the rights of undocumented workers. The varied political dynamics and 
cultures of local implementation, according to Wells, also matter. In the current era, DOL 
investigators are no longer required to inspect immigration documents, yet there has been an 
increased devolution of immigration enforcement at the workplace (Lee 2009, 2011). These 
efforts have confounded claims-making by undocumented workers (Bernhardt et al. 2009), and 
created a further challenging environment for LSEAs, whose insufficient budgets have already 
led to severe backlogs and inefficiencies (Government Accountability Office 2009). 
Consequently, protecting the rights of undocumented workers is a challenging endeavor, 
particularly in contexts where immigrant rights remain highly contested. 
To this end, this paper examines the factors that lead bureaucrats in LSEAs in two 
politically divergent immigrant destinations—San Jose, California, and Houston, Texas—to 
invest with similar vigor in the incorporation of undocumented workers. Rather than cast the 
behavior of LSEA bureaucrats toward undocumented immigrants as heroic, I suggest that the 
motivations that prompt bureaucratic actions are often highly institutionalized. This finding 
parallels the classic argument advanced by Graham Allison’s (1969) study of the Cuban missile 
crisis. Rather than adopt a value-driven view of bureaucratic behavior, Allison’s research 
demonstrated how “for large classes of issues . . . the stance of a particular player can be 
predicted with high reliability from information concerning his seat” (Allison 1969:711). In sum, 
Allison argues that the factors that motivate bureaucrats are often quite predictable, not 
necessarily extraordinary or intentional, and may not always be rooted in direct concerns for 
clients themselves. Similarly, I find that LSEAs proactively employ a status-blind approach not 
because they have a particular affinity toward undocumented workers, but rather because this 
population is the linchpin of the agency’s ability to achieve its enforcement goals. 
 
Study Methodology 
This research investigates the foundations of LSEA bureaucratic behavior toward undocumented 
workers in two cities that differ significantly in both their worker rights policies and their 
environment for immigrant rights: San Jose, California, and Houston, Texas. Both cities are 
traditional immigrant destinations (Singer 2003), with similar hourglass economies that employ 
both high-skilled immigrants and a vast army of undocumented low-wage labor. Yet, the 
political power of organized labor in San Jose far exceeds that of Houston: 13.4 percent of 
workers in San Jose are union-represented, compared with 4.9 percent of workers in the Houston 
area (Hirsch and Macpherson 2012). The infrastructure supporting worker rights also contrasts 
sharply: many fewer statutory protections and resources for claims-making are available in 
Houston. 
Moreover, the political leaders in San Jose have been far more resistant to expand federal 
immigration enforcement via local agencies. For example, in San Jose, the city council has 
overwhelmingly denounced restrictive legislation in states like Arizona (Rodriguez 2010), and 
Santa Clara County has actively rejected increased calls for local enforcement (Rusk 2010). 
Meanwhile, despite relatively supportive mayoral leadership, immigration has become a 
flashpoint on the Houston city council as public support has mounted to overturn the city’s 
“sanctuary city” policies and eliminate the long-standing Mayor’s Office of Immigrant and 
Refugee Affairs (City of Houston 2005). 
Political control theory would suggest that given the differing political landscapes of 
these two cities, LSEA bureaucrats in Houston might be more resistant to enforcing the rights of 
undocumented workers, or might offer distinct rationales for doing do. Indeed, previous 
scholarship in San Jose and Houston reveals vastly different approaches for enforcing immigrant 
rights. San Jose has a well-developed legal advocacy community that relies on worker-friendly 
state laws and a strong union movement to promote undocumented immigrant rights (Rhee and 
Sadler 2007). Conversely, a weak labor movement, absent state apparatus, and active anti-
immigrant movement has required a more coordinated response by federal LSEAs in conjunction 
with labor and immigrant advocates, and the Mexican consulate (Karson 2004). However, the 
research presented here uncovers nonetheless surprisingly similar institutional justifications for 
LSEA outreach efforts in the two cities. 
For this research, I conducted semistructured interviews with 25 high-level officials in 
each of these jurisdictions (See Table 1). I interviewed the director of each of these agencies and, 
where possible, at least one investigator or outreach person (12 individuals in San Jose, and 13 in 
Houston). I asked bureaucrats to speak about their agency’s mission and the procedures they 
used to execute it. I also asked respondents to speak specifically about how they had handled 
cases involving undocumented claimants and to identify the considerations that had shaped their 
approach. With the exception of one follow-up interview, I conducted all interviews in person at 
the agency. 
 
I conducted primary interviews in 2006. I then completed targeted follow-up interviews 
at the DOL and EEOC in 2009 and 2012 to capture information about key personnel and 
resource changes instituted by the Obama administration. All but two interviews were recorded 
and then professionally transcribed for analysis. 
 
Findings: Incorporative Behaviors 
Through the course of this research, I interrogated the behaviors and rationales that federal and 
state LSEA bureaucrats in two divergent political contexts deploy toward undocumented 
workers. I find that despite operating in a place with weaker workplace protections, more 
stringent local immigration enforcement policies, and a political landscape where organized 
labor and immigrant advocates have decidedly less power, LSEA bureaucrats in Houston 
espouse a surprisingly similar perspective on enforcing the rights of undocumented workers, as 
do their counterparts in San Jose. 
In the following sections, I identify two primary strategies that LSEA bureaucrats in both 
San Jose and Houston use to implement the rights of undocumented workers: (1) maintaining a 
status- blind approach to processing claims and (2) aggressively pursuing employers that use a 
claimants’ immigration status to deflect culpability. After discussing these tactics, I then examine 
the parallel institutional rationales that bureaucrats summon to advance the protection of 
undocumented workers’ rights. 
 
Maintaining a Status-Blind Approach to Processing Claims 
LSEAs face significant challenges in reaching out to undocumented workers. A representative of 
the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement in San Jose described the difficulty he 
faces.  
They’re scared to death to come in here . . . they’re afraid of being reported. It takes a lot 
for them to come in here and file something. So, we try to treat them with respect, we treat 
them fairly, we explain to them what we’re doing and why we’re doing it. 
In response, bureaucrats across the various state and federal jurisdictions have adopted a 
status-blind approach to processing worker claims. For example, the California Division of 
Workers’ Compensation holds monthly workshops to help Spanish-speaking injured workers 
initiate and advance a claim; during these meetings, an information and assistance officer 
regularly explains to workers that their immigration status will in no way affect their case. 
Similarly, a representative at Houston’s NLRB’s Region 16 likened his agency’s post- 
Hoffman protocol to the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. The agency initially approaches 
the whole charge on a neutral basis . . . We give full due process to each party and have 
to allow responses to allegations, and [we] pursue independent witnesses . . . If the law 
was violated . . . we review the evidence and will try to either reinstate the individual or 
make the remedy whole. 
An official at the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) also stated emphatically that 
immigration status is a non-issue for his agency 
“If an illegal laborer comes to [us] and files a complaint,” he said, “[we don’t] ask ‘show 
us your green card, show me your driver’s license, show me your Social Security 
number’ . . . That leaves the door wide open for employers to be unscrupulous.” 
The tactic of avoiding or delaying the collection of information regarding a claimant’s 
immigration status protects the worker, but more important, it shields the agent who otherwise 
may be required to take this information into account when assessing which remedies to make 
available to a claimant. The NLRB Region 16 official from Houston explained the tricky 
position Hoffman puts him in. In cases where credible information regarding worker’s 
immigration status is revealed, the law compels investigators to take it into account. However, if 
employers do not bring this information into a case, the official emphasized, “we don’t ask.” 
 
Aggressively Pursuing Employers 
In areas where clear remedies do exist, such as payment for wage theft and workers’ 
compensation, the bureaucrats I spoke with reported that they do not hesitate to push back 
strongly against an employer’s attempt to raise the undocumented status of workers as a defense 
for unlawful behavior. A lead investigator with the California Division of Labor Standards 
Enforcement explained a common scenario: “Employers will come forward after working this 
person for six months and say, ‘They don’t have a Social Security number. I don’t have to pay 
them.’” His response to these employers is incredulity. “Wait a minute, [you] broke federal law. 
I mean, which way do you want it?” The director of the California Division of Workers’ 
Compensation described her similar, typical response: “I’ve had letters come to me from 
employers who were basically trying to turn the [claimant] in, saying that they’re illegal, but I 
don’t care. They hired them; they had them working there when they got injured.” An 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) official in Houston was also unmoved 
by employer’s claims of ignorance, “It is difficult to believe,” he exclaimed, “that anyone doing 
business in this country does not know the [immigration] laws.” 
For LSEA bureaucrats in both cities, provocation from employers played no role in their 
willingness to pursue an investigation into a worker’s claim, and at times, they even proactively 
intervened when a claimant was detained by ICE. The outreach director for the EEOC in 
Houston, for example, explained how he was able to invoke a U-visa petition in the case of a 
worker who had been rounded up in a workplace raid. On advice of his attorney, the offending 
employer called ICE, and the workers were detained and incarcerated within hours. Operating in 
the nascent months following the EEOC’s formal rules on U-visa certification, and drawing on 
training he had received by the Department of Justice, this bureaucrat quickly invoked his 
agency’s authority with the help of the EEOC regional attorney. While he hoped that press from 
this case would combat racism and xenophobia toward immigrants, he also reiterated the 
importance this witness would play for the EEOC, which would now be in a better position to 
pursue this highprofile egregious sexual harassment case. 
 
Findings: Institutional Rationales 
Unlike other arenas in which rights for undocumented workers are more restricted, such as 
higher education and social service benefits, labor standards enforcement has developed a rather 
permissive set of statutory openings for incorporating undocumented claimants. One 
interpretation of this is to assume that the ambiguity of enforcement requirements predicts 
inclusive behavior. Yet, I argue that it is too simplistic to assume that bureaucrats at LSEAs 
would deploy resources and political currency toward undocumented workers only because the 
law allows for it. 
In fact, a central tenet of bureaucratic incorporation theory is the recognition that scholars 
must interrogate the policy implementation processes to understand the dynamics of immigrant 
incorporation. As law and society scholars have argued, rights on the books do not always equal 
rights in action. Agencies are rarely required by legislation, judicial rulings, or regulatory 
guidelines to adopt specific implementation strategies. There are substantial opportunities for 
agency leaders to direct scarce resources away from undocumented immigrants and toward 
other, less politically contested target populations such as youth, the elderly, or the disabled. 
Furthermore, neither federal nor state labor laws prohibit bureaucrats from inquiring about a 
worker’s undocumented status at the initial stages of a claim. In fact, doing so would surely 
create a significant deterrent effect that could help reduce the massive backlog that these 
agencies face. 
Given these limitations, why did my respondents feel so strongly that undocumented 
workers should have access to labor protections? This study suggests that they do so not because 
they necessarily believe these workers to be deserving of assistance, but because their ability to 
do so is tied directly to the legitimacy and efficacy of their agency. Despite the fact that many of 
the bureaucrats I spoke with expressed sympathy with the plight of undocumented workers, they 
also offered powerful institutional rationales for their approach. In these final sections, I review 
three that were articulated repeatedly: to reduce demand for undocumented labor, to ensure the 
agency’s ability to enforce the rights off all—undocumented and documented—workers, and to 
protect the jurisdictional autonomy and limited resources of the agency. 
 
Deter the Demand for Undocumented Labor 
When asked why they chose not to query claimants about their immigration status, many of the 
LSEA bureaucrats I interviewed began by explaining that their agency’s mission in no way 
contravened the principles of immigration enforcement. In fact, they argued that their agency’s 
ability to protect undocumented workers was in line with a broader effort to reduce the flow of 
undocumented labor. For example, an official with California Division of Workers’ 
Compensation described several outreach campaigns that have targeted workers in the 
construction and agricultural industries, which, she acknowledged, were rife with undocumented 
workers. She explained, “If we [California] did exclude illegal immigrants from workers’ comp, 
it would create a perverse incentive for employers to hire illegals because they would be cheaper 
and they [the employer] wouldn’t have to pay workers’ comp premiums.” She characterized 
states where restrictive policies bar injured undocumented workers from accessing benefits as 
grossly misdirected, explaining that, as with any insurance pool, it is imperative to have all 
stakeholders participating and paying into the system. Employers who evade California’s 
requirement to provide coverage for all their employees are rewarded with cheaper labor costs, 
which creates perverse incentives within the workers’ compensation system, gives unscrupulous 
employers an unfair market advantage, and ultimately further the demand for undocumented 
labor. 
A high-level official with the EEOC in Houston similarly offered an argument that 
echoes Justice Breyer’s dissent in Hoffman: if his agency were not allowed to enforce the rights 
of all workers, employers would be emboldened to hire undocumented workers solely “with the 
intent of exploiting them.” He argued that immigration restrictions created the conditions of 
vulnerability that undocumented workers face, and not holding employers accountable for 
violating the law only reinforces the demand for undocumented labor. Similarly, the “no-match” 
letters being issued by the Social Security Administration and the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) were a top concern for the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement. 
These letters inform employers whenever the social security information of one of their workers 
has been flagged as discrepant. Employers are not required to terminate a worker who receives a 
letter, and must follow strict protocols for when and how to inform the worker in question. 
However, in practice, employers frequently use “no-match letters” to intimidate workers. The 
result is not only a terrified claimant but also an indignant employer who feels free to continue 
hiring undocumented workers whom they could exploit. 
 
Protect Each Worker by Protecting All  
Respondents also argued that in addition to providing disincentives that could dissuade 
employers from flouting immigration laws, their status-blind approach was a tactic for 
preserving their agency’s ability to protect the rights of native-born and documented workers. 
When I asked a high-level official at the Houston EEOC why he was concentrating his efforts on 
people who did not have authorization to work, he reiterated his agency’s across-the-board 
directive: “We’re trying to uncover blatant discrimination in the workplace.” He deflected the 
issue of an employee’s immigration status as the sole responsibility of employers to screen, and 
discussed the rampant exploitation of immigrants as a statutory concern for his agency. 
Referencing the EEOC’s mandate under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which protects against 
race, color, and national origin discrimination (EEOC 2002b), he explained “[W]e’re only 
interested in looking at employment policies and practices of companies that may be exploiting 
immigrants, not because they happen to be immigrants, but because they happen to be of 
different ethnicities.” As such, undocumented claimants were seen as indistinguishable from the 
broader labor force covered by the statute. 
An analogous rational was offered to justify unconventional outreach tactics. For 
example, the director of Cal/OSHA described recent collaborations with the Mexican Consulate 
as an effort to reach out simultaneously to “underserved workers” and those in the “underground 
economy.” In his view, access to undocumented workers was central to fulfilling his agency’s 
regulatory mission: cracking down on egregious employers under the 1970 Occupational Health 
and Safety Act. He went on: 
We’ve done sweeps where we target [immigrant-dense industries], primarily agriculture 
and construction . . . We find violations are pretty rampant . . . So, to the extent we 
configure [our operations] holistically, we do it because . . . we can target the bad actors 
as much as we can.  
As such, reaching out to workers who may be undocumented is simply a necessary means 
for regulating high-violation industries writ large. 
Similarly, a high-level official with the California Division of Worker’s Compensation 
tied the litany of health and safety risks in restaurants to the concentration of undocumented 
workers in kitchens: 
Restaurants have a lot of cuts, burns, back injuries, etc. And the thing about the 
restaurant industry is that it also has a tremendous number of undocumented workers. So 
it’s one area that we know we need to target in order to reach illegal workers, and where 
we know they are concentrated. 
An official with the Texas Department of Insurance Workers’ Compensation Division 
likewise described how the rights of undocumented workers simply relate to his agency’s 
broader regulatory goals. 
“Our primary goal is to make the work place safer,” he stated, “and whether it’s an 
immigrant, a resident, a native, whatever—whatever it takes to make the work place 
safer. We want to reduce fatalities. We want to reduce injuries . . . That’s our main 
goal.” 
For each of these officials, the ability to protect the rights of undocumented workers was 
necessarily tied to their agency’s ability to protect the rights of all workers under their 
jurisdiction. 
It is important to note that in order to adopt this status-blind approach, labor standards 
enforcement agents have to draw a fine distinction between worker rights and remedies. From 
this perspective, the only necessary criterion for bringing a claim is whether the worker is a 
covered employee. For example, under the FLSA, this includes a non-exempt employee working 
for an establishment that grosses $500,000 in yearly revenue or that is engaged in interstate 
commerce. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, coverage is restricted to claims against 
employers with 15 workers or more. If a claim meets these standards and a worker can provide 
the necessary evidence and documentation, then the claim may move forward. Ultimately, 
meeting these requirements does not ensure a ruling in a claimant’s favor, or that an employer 
will ultimately meet their penalty payment obligations. However, from the perspective of the 
investigative process, LSEA bureaucrats view documented and undocumented workers in similar 
fashion. 
 
Patrol Jurisdictional Boundaries and Protect Limited Resources 
Beyond meeting their enforcement goals, LSEAs must also tightly patrol their jurisdictional 
boundaries to preserve their agency’s autonomy and scarce resources. This is not to say that the 
bureaucrats I spoke with did not care about the well-being of the workers with whom they 
interacted. To be sure, many bureaucrats expressed considerable sympathy for undocumented 
victims of workplace violations. However, bureaucratic staff in a wide range of settings 
understandably will work to preserve their job and do whatever possible to make their tasks 
easier. Institutional motivations for bureaucratic discretion do not always privilege the well-
being of undocumented immigrants, as is the case with ICE agents who are resisting the 
implementation of President Obama’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) 
initiative. However, in the case of LSEAs, institutional incentives happen to help protect 
undocumented workers. 
When resources are scarce—a stark reality for LSEAs for the past several decades (Bobo 
2008)—carrying out the functions of another agency whose goals directly contravene your own, 
is illogical. Respondents repeatedly pointed out that they wanted nothing to do with immigration 
enforcement functions, citing dwindling resources and their inability to sufficiently investigate 
and proactively enforce abuses. This reaction is similar to how social workers and other 
professionals defend their turf—by defining the boundaries of their field and partitioning the 
division of labor within it (Abbott 1995). 
For example, an official with Cal/OSHA, reflected on how continued attempts to use 
labor standards enforcement as a stepping-stone for immigration enforcement would inevitably 
prove disastrous for his agency. He recounted an incident in 2005 in which agents from the DHS 
posed as OSHA agents and rounded up a group of undocumented workers who had shown up for 
what they thought was mandatory safety training. These operations, he explained, challenge 
OSHA’s legitimacy, do irreparable damage to undocumented workers’ willingness to come 
forward, and complicate the agency’s ability to hold the employers who unlawfully hire them 
accountable. 
Even conservative respondents marked these boundaries. For example, a high-level DOL 
administrator in Houston, who did not want to be recorded, explained rather unsympathetically 
the situation facing workers who might find themselves caught up in an ICE raid. However, he 
stressed that the MOU between DOL and ICE limited how much immigration enforcement 
agents could encroach on his agency’s efforts to regulate labor standards, a boundary he worked 
hard to maintain. His own rationale for this separation, he emphasized, was not the protection of 
undocumented workers, but the preservation of his agency’s autonomy. He wanted to operate 
unhindered by the objectives of another agency whose resources far outweighed his own. 
Bureaucrats situated in California and Texas LSEAs similarly also justified this 
jurisdictional boundary by the principles of the U.S. system of federalism, which starkly 
demarcate state and federal governance. For example, an investigator with the California 
Division of Labor Standards Enforcement was quick to distinguish his agency’s labor standards 
enforcement responsibilities from those of federal immigration enforcement: 
Like I said before, our policy is: if you work, you get paid . . . Federal law provides that 
an employer is supposed to check the Social Security number, get the I-9 signed and the 
authorization to work in the United States within three days of employment. We don’t 
enforce federal laws, whether they did that [used false papers] or didn’t, we don’t care . . 
. We do not have jurisdiction; we will not enforce federal law . . . We do not share any 
information with the INS, and I don’t believe [an investigator] would have to ask [about 
legal status]. 
He and other state agents repeatedly reminded me that they represented the interests of 
their state, not those of the federal government. 
In sum, many LSEA bureaucrats rejected the notion that their resources should be used to 
pursue the goals of ICE, whose objectives clearly contradicted their own. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite a setting defined by contradictory laws and policies, LSEAs remain committed to 
protecting the rights of undocumented workers. I have described how, in response to judicial 
interpretations that have limited the remedies available to undocumented workers, LSEAs have 
crafted outreach campaigns and bureaucratic procedures that elide the issue of immigration 
status. In both San Jose and Houston, two politically divergent places, I uncovered a pattern of 
“don’t ask, don’t tell” that has allowed bureaucrats at LSEAs to maximize the protections they 
can offer to undocumented workers. These findings reaffirm the importance of institutional 
logics, which have been the subject of key research in organizational sociology (e.g., DiMaggio 
and Powell 1994; Thornton and Ocasio 1999), 
The mere existence of undocumented workers’ legal rights cannot explain how and why 
LSEA bureaucrats have responded this way. Research in the area of bureaucratic incorporation 
offers one explanation—namely, that the professional mission of LSEAs encourages bureaucrats 
to regard undocumented immigrants as workers who deserve their sympathy. These bureaucrats 
may indeed be predisposed in this direction, since they may have selected this profession 
because of their desire to serve deserving populations (Marrow 2012). However, the evidence 
presented in this study offers an alternative explanation. 
My findings reveal three common, and not mutually exclusive, justifications for the 
bureaucratic incorporation of undocumented workers into LSEAs: (1) efforts to reduce the 
exploitability of undocumented workers and thus reduce their demand by employers, (2) the 
conviction that the protection of undocumented workers is essential to the agency’s ability to 
regulate industry standards and enforce the rights of all workers, and (3) attempts to preserve the 
agency’s autonomy, legitimacy, and scarce resources. The bureaucratic distinction between 
rights and remedies helped to facilitate this status-blind approach. 
The identification of the status-blind approach in two politically divergent cities 
repudiates theories that would privilege the political culture of an enforcement environment as a 
singular force driving bureaucratic discretion. While my findings affirm the importance of 
institutional factors such as an agency’s statutory mandate and professional mission, I also find 
that the mundane  factors underlying organizational also matter. These findings from San Jose 
and Houston may speak to the bureaucratic experiences in a variety of other large traditional 
immigrant destinations. More research is needed, however, in new destinations such as the South 
where the immigrant labor force is rapidly changing, as well as in jurisdictions such as Arizona 
where ant immigrant state legislation has directed state resources toward worksite enforcement 
of immigration law. 
These findings also suggest applications for our understanding of how other institutional 
arenas may be responding to undocumented workers and other disenfranchised groups. 
Institutional incentives may drive bureaucratic behavior, not only in contexts where goods and 
services are limited (such as undocumented students in higher education), but also in contexts 
where jurisdictional boundaries and statutory imperatives conflict (such as perhaps community 
policing). The case of LSEAs has demonstrated how bureaucrats use a statusblind approach to 
reconcile competing directives, while also advancing their own agency’s legitimacy within their 
jurisdiction. In this instance, the end effect is an open-door policy for undocumented workers. 
Yet, recalling work on the bureaucratic implementation of civil rights legislation of the 1960s 
(see, for example, Bonastia 2010), we know that the structure of an organization can also be the 
source of its limited efficacy and the ultimate failure of policy implementation. 
Finally, this research suggests that the status-blind approach adopted by LSEAs should 
not be viewed as a panacea for addressing the exploitation of undocumented workers. 
Undocumented workers frequently fall outside of agency jurisdictions, or are misclassified as 
independent contractors (National Employment Law Project [NELP] 2009). At-will employment 
policies pose further challenges (Garcia 2012). We know than only a small fraction of workers 
who experience a violation actually come forward to file a claim, and when they do, the measure 
of aid they are eligible for often pales in comparison with the real losses they have experienced 
(Bernhardt et al. 2009). Employers have also come to view paltry labor standards enforcement 
penalties as merely the cost of doing business (Bernhardt et al. 2008.) Finally, the long-term 
viability of the bureaucratic incorporation of undocumented workers will ultimately be limited in 
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1. The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has met its annual goal of deporting 
400,000 unauthorized immigrants in large part by deputizing state and local law enforcement 
through programs such as 287(g) and Secure Communities. These programs follow a long line of 
federal policies meant to restrict immigrant rights over the last two decades, such as the 1996 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, and the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act. 
2. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982). 
3. See 1999 Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act. 
4. See 1986 Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act. 
5. The focus of this article is squarely on the institutional responses to advancing immigrant 
worker rights. Elsewhere, scholars have written extensively on the ways in which undocumented 
workers contest their poor labor market conditions through unions and worker centers (see, for 
example, Gordon 2007; Milkman, Bloom, and Narro 2010.) 
6. Bureaucracies may also adopt hybrid missions that offer contradictory directives, such as 
when police are not only uniquely authorized to “employ the state’s coercive power” to enforce 
rules, but also expected to protect all individuals who fall under their jurisdiction (Marrow 
2009:768; see also Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003). 
7. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 535 U.S. 137 
(2002). 
8. Later challenges would also highlight the “criminal element” that was purportedly inherent in 
undocumented workers, which, according to some, constituted blatant abuse of the American 
legal system. See, for example, arguments in 2003 Sanchez et al. v. Eagle Alloy (2003 658 
N.W.2d 510), Jane Doe v. Kansas Department of Human Resources (2004 Kan. LEXIS 262), 
Ulloa v. Al’s All Tree Service (2003 68 N.Y.S.2d 556), Sanango v. 200 East 16th (2004 788 
N.Y.S.2d 314), and Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc. (2005 868 A.2d 994). 
9. Agri Processor Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1 (2008). 
10. Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 47. Subsequent to Mezonos, the General 
Counsel office at the NLRB issued an “Operations Management Memorandum” upholding the 
premise that an “employee’s work authorization status is irrelevant to the underlying question of 
the employer’s liability under the Act,” but also requiring that an employer must present 
sufficient evidence during compliance hearings to demonstrate a valid basis for raising the issue 
of a worker’s immigration status (NLRB 2012). 
11. See Brownell (2010) for an excellent summary of the provenance of Sure-Tan and Hoffman 
and an institutionalist approach to understanding the court’s decisions. 
12. Immigrant worker advocates such as the National Employment Law Project (NELP) have 
worked to enforce these agreements, noting that employer retaliation against undocumented 
claimants remains rampant. The challenge on the ground is that these retaliatory actions do not 
always percolate to the top of the overwhelmed agency’s priorities. Furthermore, the 
memorandums of understanding (MOUs) remain political fraught, and complicated by infrequent 
and inefficient opportunities for the DOL to alert ICE of those investigations that would be 
significantly disrupted by a raid (Personal communication with the National Employment Law 
Project, February 22, 2012, and May 2, 2012). 
13. To address the disproportionate health and safety risks facing Hispanic workers, the DOL has 
sponsored a “Hispanic Health and Safety Summit” (Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration [OSHA] 2004, 2010), and every year the DOL co-sponsors “Labor Rights 
Week/Semana de Derechos Laborales” in conjunction with the Mexican Consulate and several 
other LSEAs and community groups. These efforts were reinvigorated during the leadership of 
Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis (2009–2013) 
14. California Labor Code 1171.5 reads, “All California workers—whether or not they are 
legally authorized to work in the United States—are protected by state laws regulating wages and 
working conditions . . . The California Department of Industrial Relations—which enforces the 
state’s labor and workplace safety and health laws—will not question workers about their 
immigrant status” (California Department of Industrial Relations [CA-DIR] 2009). 
15. The form required for filing a wage claim under the Texas Payday Law clearly states that 
providing a social security number is optional, and the intake form used by the Texas Workplace 
Commission Civil Rights Division does not request it at all (Texas Workforce Commission 
[TWC] 2012). Undocumented workers who are covered by employer policies also remain 
eligible for benefits in Texas (Beardall 2010). 
16. In 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was dismantled and three new 
agencies were created under the provisions of the Homeland Security Act: U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and ICE. 
17. Due to legal advocacy through the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, and 
sympathetic support from the President’s cabinet, DOL bureaucrats were eventually instructed to 
cease such inspections in complaint-driven cases (Wells 2004:1333). 
18. While I cannot exclude other unarticulated intentions that these respondents may have for 
their actions, in this paper, I base my conclusions on the ways in which LSEA bureaucrats 
discuss their behavior toward undocumented claimants. Ultimately, my focus here is on the 
similar ways in which LSEA bureaucrats in these two divergent contexts justify and carry out the 
rights of undocumented workers, which I argue highlights the importance of institutional factors 
driving bureaucratic incorporation. 
19. Golden (2000), similarly engages Mile’s law in her examination of bureaucratic behavior 
during the Reagan era when, grounded in their loyalty to the agency and its principals, civil 
servants in the Department of Justice Division of Civil Rights contested the wishes of political 
appointees. See also Miles (1978). 
20. Estimates place the undocumented population in Santa Clara County at 10.2 percent of the 
population (Hill and Johnson 2011:17), while an estimated 8 percent of Houston–Sugar Land–
Baytown metropolitan area residents are estimated undocumented (Jankowski 2006:1). 
21. While non-union worker centers exist in both cities, I refer here to union representation as a 
well accepted marker of inequality and the political power afforded to workers (Western and 
Rosenfeld 2011). 
22. For example, whereas the California Department of Labor Standards Enforcement has 21 
field offices throughout the state, with one located directly in downtown San Jose, all offices of 
the TWC are concentrated nearly three hours away in the state capital of Austin, leaving Houston 
workers to rely on a mail-in claims process. In terms of wage and hour standards, the state of 
California provides a higher minimum hourly wage for workers ($7.50 on January 1, 2007). 
California also provides additional discrimination and health/safety protections for workers. 
Conversely, Texas protections merely mimic federal standards (including a minimum hourly 
wage of $5.85 as of July 24, 2007). Since March 11, 2013, workers in the City of San Jose are 
subject to a $10 minimum hourly wage, though this ordinance falls outside the scope of this 
article. 
23. Copies of the semistructured interview questionnaire are available upon request. 
24. The immigrant rights marches of 2006 were a prominent theme in the political background of 
both cities, though the historical significance of the mobilizations was not immediately apparent 
during the early course of this research. While an obvious theme for discussion with civil society 
advocates, LSEA staff I spoke to made little direct reference to the protests. 
25. Interview, California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, San Jose, November 20, 
2006. 
26. Interview, California Division of Workers’ Compensation, San Jose, August 18, 2009. 
27. Fox (2012) identifies similar tactics among social workers in the Northeast and Midwest 
during the earlier part of the century. 
28. Interview, TWC, Austin, October 20, 2006. 
29. See Chen (2012) for an extensive discussion of how different federal agencies have instituted 
regulatory responses post Hoffman. 
30. Advocates have documented employer intimidation in labor standards enforcement 
proceedings, and it is not uncommon for employers to raise the issue of a claimant’s immigration 
status in their defense, as evidenced by the many state and federal court cases that have debated 
the issue post Hoffman. (See Garcia 2011 for a discussion of the judicial impact of Hoffman.) 
31. Interview, California Division of Workers Compensation, Oakland, December 11, 2006. 
32. Interview, OSHA, Houston, October 17, 2006. 
33. Several state and federal LSEAs now certify “U-visas,” which provide legal status to 
undocumented immigrants who have been the victim of a crime, and who agree to aid in the 
labor standards enforcement investigation (NELP 2011a). See Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) memorandum issued July 3, 2008 concerning “EEOC Procedures for U 
Nonimmigrant Classification Certification” (see http://iwp.legalmomentum.org/immigration/u-
visa/government-memoranda-
andfactsheets/U%20VISA_EEOC%20Certification%20Memo_7.3.08.pdf). 
34. Interview, EEOC, Houston, June 30, 2009. 
35. See, for example, the DOL’s YouthRules! initiative, and the EEOC’s Leadership for the 
Employment of Americans with Disabilities campaign. 
36. The vast welfare state literature provides examples of strategies that agencies have adopted to 
reduce caseload. For example, historically social service agencies have implemented seemingly 
innocuous requirements for applying for benefits, such as multiple office visits, which may 
nevertheless deter resource-poor populations from meeting minimum eligibility requirements to 
receive benefits (For a discussion of such diversion tactics, see, for example, Goldberg 2007; 
National Center for Law and Economic Justice 1998; Reese 2005). 
37. Interview, EEOC, Houston, June 23, 2006. 
38. Interview, California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, November 20, 2006. 
39. Interview, EEOC, Houston, June 23, 2006. 
40. Interview, EEOC, Houston, June 23, 2006. 
41. Interview, Cal/OSHA, Oakland, November 21, 2006. 
42. Interview, California Division of Workers’ Compensation, Oakland, December 11, 2006. 
43. Interview, Texas Division of Insurance, Department of Workers’ Compensation, Austin, 
October 19, 
2006. 
44. To be sure, I am not suggesting that immigration status does not affect the outcome of a 
claim, or that industries where undocumented workers are located do not face particular 
structural challenges According to a report by the NELP, “Many workers—even after 
overcoming the fear of asserting their right to be paid, filing a wage claim or suit, gathering 
evidence, and receiving a winning judgment— are never able to collect their unpaid wage 
judgments . . . Employers file bankruptcy. They hide their assets. They shut down operations and 
reorganize as a ‘new’ entity. Some simply cannot be found. In 2009, the California Division of 
Labor Standards Enforcement assessed nearly $22.4 million in wages due but was only able to 
collect for workers about $13 million, or just 58 percent of those wages. The remaining wages 
were left unpaid” (NELP 2011b:111). 
45. In 2012, the ICE officer’s union sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), citing 
that by enforcing Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), DHS is breaking the law by 
choosing not to enforce the deportation of these low-priority undocumented immigrants (see 
Christopher L. Crane et al., v. Janet Napolitano, in her official capacity as secretary of Homeland 
Security, et al., Civil Action No. 3:12-cv-03247-O, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-
txnd-3_12-cv-03247/pdf/USCOURTS-txnd-3_12-cv-03247-1.pdf) 
46. Interview, Cal/OSHA, Oakland, November 21, 2006. 
47. ICE will call in the DOL to interview workers during immigration raids if they suspect 
workplace violations, as was the case in the high-profile 2006 raid of the shipping supply firm 
IFCO Systems (Houston Chronicle 2006). 
48. Interview, DOL, Houston, October 17, 2006. According to a report by the Migration Policy 
Institute, “the US government spends more on its immigration enforcement agencies than on all 
its other principal criminal federal law enforcement agencies combined” (Meissner 2013). 
49. My findings, however, do not speak to the varied ways that the courts have interpreted the 
rights afforded to undocumented workers. See for example, Chen’s (2013) discussion of how 
state courts vary in the remedies afforded to injured undocumented workers within the workers’ 
compensation system. 
50. Similar critiques have been articulated regarding the limits of color-blind approaches to 
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